In Washington, President Kennedy receives Moscow Radio's broadcast of Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviet missiles in Cuba will be dismantled and withdrawn

Outcome: In Washington, President Kennedy receives Moscow Radio's broadcast of Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviet missiles in Cuba will be dismantled and withdrawn by 1962-10-28.

Start state: 1962-10-16, Washington. At 8:45 that morning McGeorge Bundy told the President that U-2 photographs show Soviet medium-range missile sites under construction in Cuba, and Kennedy has called his principal advisers together in secret; nothing has been said in public and no blockade exists yet. Actors: John F. Kennedy (President of the United States), Robert F. Kennedy (Attorney General), Robert S. McNamara (Secretary of Defense), Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Llewellyn Thompson (Ambassador-at-large), Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

Milestones

Robert Kennedy should request CIA assessment through McCone of Soviet intelligence capabilities to detect U.S. discovery of missile sites—specifically whether KGB assets in Washington or Moscow's reconnaissance could reveal ExComm deliberations before U.S. goes public. This tests whether maintained secrecy preserves asymmetric advantage for choosing response timing. by 1962-10-16 held
Llewellyn Thompson should prepare classified assessment by October 18 analyzing Khrushchev's likely reaction to blockade versus air strike options, drawing on his Moscow ambassador experience to evaluate whether Kremlin would interpret military action as requiring symmetric response or accept quarantine as negotiable pressure, specifically addressing information gaps about internal Soviet decision-making that could produce unauthorized field actions during crisis. by 1962-10-16 held
By October 28, Llewellyn Thompson should review timeline of all Soviet diplomatic signals from October 16-27—formal letters, back-channel contacts, public broadcasts—to determine whether Moscow's messaging pattern shows coordinated strategy or reactive improvisation. This clarifies whether Saturday's Turkey demand represented planned escalation (validating compound-error thesis that U.S. misread Soviet timeline discipline) or opportunistic pivot after U-2 loss, informing future crisis-bargaining tempo assumptions. by 1962-10-20 held
Robert Kennedy should immediately verify through intelligence channels whether the shootdown was authorized by Moscow or represented local commander initiative, as this distinction determines whether Khrushchev controls escalation. Simultaneously, Llewellyn Thompson should assess whether the second letter's timing suggests Kremlin hardliners overruled Khrushchev's initial offer, which would indicate Soviet internal division exploitable through rapid acceptance of the first letter while ignoring the second. by 1962-10-20 held
Robert F. Kennedy should document within one week what specific intelligence details about construction pace and U-2 surveillance he disclosed to Dobrynin versus what he withheld, and whether Dobrynin indicated Soviet awareness of the Anderson shootdown timing, to test whether information asymmetry actually created negotiating pressure or whether Moscow already possessed equivalent intelligence through its own channels. by 1962-10-24 could not be judged
John F. Kennedy should request from the Joint Chiefs by October 25 a detailed written analysis of what military outcomes they consider institutional success versus failure in Cuba, and separately request from Dean Rusk the same for diplomatic outcomes. Comparing these documents will reveal whether the incentive misalignment can be bridged or requires continued executive arbitration between irreconcilable institutional reward structures. by 1962-10-24 held